Introduction Since the end of the WWII, Europe’s relationship with the Global South has remained one of the most complex and tension-filled components of the world’s political and economic structure. In the post-war decades, Europe re-entered the global stage as the dismantler of colonial empires, the architect of its own reconstruction, and a self-proclaimed advocate of a new international order. Its relations with the Global South evolved alongside European integration itself—from an initial focus on 'responsibility' and 'assistance,' to the later phase of 'normative diplomacy' and political conditionality, and most recently to the geopolitically competitive posture that has emerged in the context of global multipolarity.
This transformation reflects not only changes in the international structure but also a profound redefinition of Europe’s own role. During the Cold War, Europe acted as a 'provider of aid' under the umbrella of American security and economic prosperity. After the Cold War, it sought to project its identity through institutional and value expansion as a 'normative power.' In the twenty-first century, confronted with intensifying geopolitical rivalry, the European Union (EU) has been compelled to move from an idealised rule-exporter to a competitive actor defending its interests and influence.
My speech analyses, through both historical continuity and contemporary dynamics, the institutional logic and political tensions underpinning the EU’s relationship with the Global South. Its central argument is that the evolution of this relationship constitutes a continuous process of redefining Europe’s identity, power, and perception of global order. The driving force behind this transformation lies less in changes within the South itself than in Europe’s shifting understanding of its own position in a de-Westernising world.
I. Continuities after the War: From Colonial Legacy to Development Partnership Europe’s post-war external relations were deeply marked by the shadow of colonial structures. Although decolonisation swept through Africa and Asia, economic dependence and institutional linkages persisted. The 1957 Treaty of Rome not only established the European Economic Community (EEC) but also embedded in its provisions a sense of ‘responsibility’ toward overseas countries and territories.
The Yaoundé Conventions of the 1960s and the Lomé Conventions from 1975 onwards institutionalised these ties. Through preferential trade arrangements, financial aid, and price-stabilisation mechanisms, the EEC constructed a cooperation system centred on the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. While this system was presented as a partnership of equals, it in fact maintained a one-way dependency: Europe exported capital, standards, and institutions, while the South supplied raw materials and markets.
The Lomé framework reflected Europe’s early developmentalist faith. Its underlying logic equated modernisation with ‘Europeanisation.’ Europe universalised its own historical experience as a model for others to emulate, making this worldview the cultural foundation of its Cold War–era policies toward the South.
By the early 1980s, however, this system began to falter. The global debt crisis undermined the economic capacity of developing countries and reduced the effectiveness of European aid. Meanwhile, the United States and international financial institutions promoted structural adjustment programmes that displaced the Lomé model. The EEC was forced to reconsider its identity in the Global South: neither a purely economic bloc nor a geopolitical power in its own right. This structural ambiguity would later become a lasting feature of EU external action.
II. The Post-Cold War Order and the Rise of ‘Normative Diplomacy’ The end of the Cold War provided the EU with unprecedented institutional and moral space. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consolidation of American unipolarity, Europe’s external environment shifted from one of ‘security dependence’ to ‘institutional expansion.’ In the 1990s, the EU politicised development policy, arguing that economic cooperation must go hand in hand with political reform. This logic was codified in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, which made democracy, human rights, and good governance explicit conditions for aid.
This marked the transition from a developmentalist Europe to a normative Europe. During this phase, the EU pursued three mutually reinforcing goals: 1. Shaping external order through institutional export; 2. Promoting political transformation via conditional aid; 3. Enhancing its status as a ‘rule-maker’ in global governance.
The emergence of this normative power embodied European confidence and its aspiration to substitute values for traditional power politics. Europe viewed its engagement with the Global South not as a projection of dominance but as an extension of universal principles.
Yet this idealism soon revealed multiple tensions. Many southern partners regarded conditionality as a veiled form of neo-colonialism. While accepting EU aid, they also sought alternative financing from Asia. The rise of China and India in the early twenty-first century seriously challenged Europe’s model of influence.
Within Europe itself, there was growing recognition that normative power alone could not provide the hard-power foundation needed in a competitive environment. The EU’s influence remained largely discursive and institutional rather than material. After the 2008 global financial crisis, Europe’s internal crises weakened its external capacities, while the South increasingly embraced diversified diplomacy.
III. The Era of Geopolitical Competition: Strategic Redefinition The 2010s brought profound structural changes. Multipolarity, de-Westernisation, and the rising bargaining power of southern countries eroded the appeal of Europe’s normative discourse. More importantly, the globalisation of Sino-American rivalry transformed development cooperation into an arena of major-power contestation.
In response, the EU introduced new external strategies. The Global Gateway, launched in 2021, was presented as a European alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Officially framed around transparency, sustainability, and partnership, the initiative reflected a defensive strategic awareness: the EU sought to safeguard its influence and narrative authority in the Global South.
EU development policy has thus shifted from aid and development to strategy and competition. It has been integrated into broader geopolitical agendas such as climate diplomacy, digital cooperation, and energy transition. Commission President von der Leyen’s call for a ‘Geopolitical Commission’ signified a decisive move away from a purely normative discourse toward a vision of Europe as an actor capable of strategic action.
However, this transformation remains incomplete. EU external action faces three main constraints: 1. Institutional fragmentation. Member states retain independent development policies, limiting the coherence of ‘Team Europe’ coordination. 2. Resource limitations. Compared with China’s investment scale or US security commitments, EU projects remain slow and financially fragmented, lacking strategic leverage. 3. Perceptual gaps. Many southern countries still perceive the EU as a moralising actor—procedurally rigid and insufficiently flexible to be a genuine partner.
As a result, EU external action is caught in a double dilemma: politically compelled to assert geopolitical autonomy, yet normatively constrained by its own liberal traditions. Europe aspires to act as a ‘strategic actor,’ but struggles to escape the self-imposed limits of its ‘normative power’ identity.
IV. Conclusion: Between Idealism and Power—Europe’s Future Choices The seventy-year evolution of EU–Global South relations is a history of continual interaction between Europe’s modernisation experience, institutional ideals, and international role. The EU’s greatest challenge today is not external rivalry but internal self-definition. It must confront a fundamental question: what kind of power does Europe aspire to be in a decentralised world?
The EU must now reconstruct its strategy toward the South in a more pragmatic way. It needs to act as a co-builder rather than a preacher, engaging southern partners on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
Looking ahead, the EU’s engagement with the Global South may evolve along three interrelated paths: 1. Strategic autonomy — carving out an independent space between the US and China by building long-term partnerships in green transition, digital cooperation, and sustainable development; 2. Institutional flexibility — reforming complex aid mechanisms to improve efficiency and political visibility; 3. Narrative renewal — shifting from rule-centrism to consensus-based partnership, replacing unilateral norm export with shared governance and cultural dialogue.
As the former High Representative Josep Borrell aptly remarked, ‘Europe must learn to listen.’ Only when Europe recognises that the Global South has become a co-shaper, rather than a passive recipient of world order, can it rebuild its influence and credibility in the 21st century.
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