It is a great pleasure and honour to be here. I wish to express my gratitude to the organisers, to East China Normal University, with whom we have cooperated very closely for many years, and to the Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research for this invitation. I will briefly introduce the broader context before turning to practical proposals concerning the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Before doing so, I wish to stress the importance of the historical legacy of Soviet policy and Soviet support in the decolonisation process. This began in the mid-1950s with the Bandung Declaration and the Asia-Africa Conference. The Soviet Union consistently supported the Bandung principles and sought to implement them in concrete foreign policy. On the occasion of this year's anniversary of the Bandung Conference, the Valdai Club, my think tank, together with Indonesian colleagues, will prepare a special report on the historical significance of the Bandung Conference and what it means for Indonesian youth today, drawing on the contributions of several young Indonesian experts, among others. This is an important undertaking, and the spirit of Bandung remains valid, including for Russia. We also supported and cooperated with the Non-Aligned Movement and the broader struggle for peace.
A further point concerns the economic and cultural assistance extended by the Soviet Union to decolonised and newly independent countries across Asia and Africa, and in particular our support for socialist countries and people's democracies worldwide. One need only recall Cuba, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, and many others.
Turning to the present situation: in Russia, we regard the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as the true cornerstone of common security and development for Eurasia. The organisation is developing in a positive direction, advancing the spirit of mutual trust and cooperation among its member states, and we also witness the joint efforts of SCO members in strengthening security and combating terrorism across Eurasia.
On another point: we welcome the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. A great many practical steps have already been taken towards convergence between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union, which unites Russia and several other post-Soviet countries in Central Asia. We also actively promote the mutually beneficial China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership, which is of genuine importance to Russian security and development.
Regarding BRICS: it has clearly become a symbol of solidarity, of the global majority, and of the non-Western and Southern world. Russia is not situated in the South geographically, but I would suggest that Russia may now be considered part of the Global South in political terms. We may also employ broader designations such as 'Global Non-West' or 'Global Majority,' both of which are widely used in Russia. The enlargement of BRICS is a sign of its growing significance, and we also observe the evolution of what has come to be called the 'BRICS Spirit.' It was our Chinese friends who first introduced this term in the BRICS Summit Declaration of 2017, during China's presidency, and it was repeated during the subsequent Chinese presidency in 2022. Since then, the concept of the BRICS Spirit has appeared in all subsequent BRICS declarations.
Turning now to practical tasks. The first priority, in my view, is to strengthen genuine solidarity within BRICS and the SCO, particularly in the face of the Trump administration's attacks on BRICS members and on the Global South more broadly, whether on de-dollarisation, tariffs, or other fronts. This past summer, the Valdai Club held a conference in South Africa with our South African colleagues. They stated openly that, as South Africa had become one of the primary targets of Donald Trump's attacks, they sought greater solidarity and support from BRICS members and did not wish to face the United States alone. The same sentiment was subsequently expressed by Brazilian colleagues. An extraordinary online BRICS Summit was convened under the Brazilian presidency specifically to address the question of how to respond to Trump's offensive. Yet to date, all BRICS countries continue to negotiate with the Trump administration on a bilateral basis: China, India, Russia, and nearly all the others. What is needed now is a transition from symbolism to practice, with deeper cooperation in the economic and financial spheres. I am in full agreement with what Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr. said regarding the New Development Bank and related matters.
It also seems important to me to strengthen independent agendas within the SCO and, in particular, within BRICS. Half a year ago, I published a special report on the evolution of the BRICS platform of shared values on the Valdai Club website. In reviewing that evolution, I observed that at least until very recently, a recurring pattern could be identified: a concept would be discussed at a G7 meeting; half a year or a year later, it would appear at a G20 meeting; and two years after that, it would be repeated at a BRICS meeting. In other words, BRICS was following the Western agenda rather than advancing its own initiatives. Perhaps the first breakthrough came in 2014, during the first South African presidency of BRICS, when for the first time BRICS put forward its own proposal for support and financial assistance for African countries. Subsequently, at the outset of the Brazilian presidency, the New Development Bank was established. Yet limitations remain. Paulo has already mentioned some of them. Setting aside the case of Russia, which I appreciate is quite exceptional: we have a contingency reserve pool within BRICS, yet when a member such as Ethiopia faces severe financial difficulties, that reserve is not mobilised on its behalf. Instead, Ethiopia was compelled to turn to the IMF, with all the conditionalities that entails, including human rights requirements and the like.
A final point: I believe we must strengthen a unified, coordinated position for the Global Non-Western South within the G20. At present, all the Western members of the G20 speak with a single, consolidated voice and a single, consolidated position. The positions of Global South countries, by contrast, are diverse. The result is that in one scenario, the G20 simply accepts Western proposals in a relatively mild form; in the other, when the Global South does not concur, nothing is decided at all. This must change, so that the voice of the Global South and the global non-West may carry greater weight within the G20 in relation to Western partners.
Those are the points I wished to raise. The two reports I mentioned are available on the Valdai Club website, one on the Bandung Conference and one on the BRICS platform of shared values. Thank you very much.
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