I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the organisers for arranging this East Asia exchange session. Last year's session yielded very meaningful results. As we know, Japan has recently been accelerating its military expansion, in particular constructing missile bases and ammunition depots aimed at the Chinese mainland on its south-western islands, including Miyakojima, Ishigaki, and Oita. Japan's pretext for this is the 'China threat' narrative. It is therefore of great importance for friends in the anti-war movements of Japan and Ryukyu to counter the Japanese government's 'China threat' narrative. For this reason, their ability to come to the Chinese mainland, hear directly from friends on the mainland, and bring back what they have heard is of considerable significance. They are also very eager to establish channels of dialogue with the Chinese mainland, beginning at the civil society level, replacing confrontation with dialogue. Following last year's exchange session, friends from Ryukyu advanced the outcomes of the session by holding press conferences and publishing dedicated articles in newspapers. Friends from Japan's 'Joint Action Against US–Japan Imperialism and Neoliberalism' reported on the outcomes of the session through a series of travelling report meetings. They also compiled a report collection on participation in the Global South Forum, which was sold on site. Professor Lu Xinyu, Professor Lin Zheyuan, and I all contributed articles to this collection. They were pleased to inform me that every copy sold out.
The anti-'Taiwan independence,' anti-intervention movement in Taiwan, which refers principally to intervention by the US–Japan imperial powers, is in essence an anti-imperialist movement. Viewed on an East Asian scale, it becomes apparent that we have comrades in Japan, Ryukyu, and South Korea. Our common struggle is directed against US imperialism, and what we oppose is the same thing: the United States' military deployment in East Asia to encircle China. This is, of course, not a recent development; it has been the case since the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. Since 2018, however, when the United States launched its trade war against China, it has also applied pressure on Japan, South Korea, and the Taiwan region to expand their armaments. This has not only heightened military tensions but has caused grave harm to the democratic well-being of people across the region. We feel this acutely. This sense of 'urgency' is distinct from a general understanding of the situation or of theory; it is the kind of urgency that creates the conditions for a movement to become a mass movement. It is also this urgency that has generated, among the civil anti-imperialist movements of Taiwan, Japan, Ryukyu, and South Korea, the need to strengthen solidarity.
Beyond this, as the Taiwan region sits at the forefront of the United States' effort to encircle the Chinese mainland, we have in recent years begun to attract the attention of left-wing and progressive groups from around the world, who have reached out to us seeking to understand the position of the Taiwanese left. This is of considerable importance to their ability to arrive at a complete understanding of the cross-strait question.
Friends in Japan and Ryukyu, in opposing Japan's military expansion, must counter the Japanese government's 'China threat' narrative and its 'Taiwan Contingency' thesis ('if Taiwan is in crisis, Japan is in crisis'). They hope to hear voices from Taiwan that also oppose these positions. Without such voices, the mainstream Japanese media portrays Taiwan as strongly endorsing the 'China threat' narrative and as wholeheartedly welcoming Japan's 'Taiwan Contingency' thesis.
When we began attempting to make our positions heard abroad, we discovered that we have done far less than the 'pro-independence' forces. In addition to the United States exploiting its global discursive power to generate a wide range of anti-China narratives, the 'Taiwan independence' camp itself has been very actively publishing and promoting 'pro-independence' books in Japan and South Korea, all of course built upon a distorted account of Taiwanese history. The 'pro-independence' forces have also been actively engaging in civil exchanges across Asian countries in an attempt to broaden what they call their international public opinion.
After the United States, Japan is the country to which the 'pro-independence' camp attaches the greatest importance. In 2018, it erected a monument called the 'Taiwan Tower' in the Peace Memorial Park in Ryukyu, inscribed with the name of Tsai Ing-wen and holds annual commemorative activities in Ryukyu for Taiwanese who died in the Battle of Okinawa. The intention is to establish a connection with Ryukyu's anti-war movement through a distorted conception of 'peace.'
The far-right position of the 'pro-independence' camp, however, is inherently incompatible with Ryukyu's progressive movements. The reverse side of the 'Taiwan Tower' erected by the 'pro-independence' camp in Ryukyu bears the following inscription: 'In mourning for the Taiwanese soldiers who gave their lives on the battlefield in the Second World War. In those years, Japanese and Taiwanese soldiers were compatriots, sharing life and death, honour, and disgrace.' This extreme right-wing understanding of history stands in complete contradiction to the values of the left-wing and progressive movements of Japan and Ryukyu.
Furthermore, on the most fundamental question of opposing military bases, the 'pro-independence' camp supports the presence of US military bases. On this issue, therefore, they can only offer evasive responses.
The situation we face has brought our anti-imperialist solidarity movement to a new turning point. We need to make greater efforts to explain to the outside world the position of the left-winged Taiwanese on the cross-strait question and on the question of reunification. The greatest difficulty we currently face in this regard is that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has cultivated, both domestically and internationally, an image of itself as a progressive party, particularly in its international projection. We are all aware that the DPP is a pro-American, far-right, anti-nationalist party, and as a result most of us have overlooked this dimension of its international image-making.
More absurdly still, many right-wing forces in other countries understand the DPP's far-right character perfectly well, yet the left-wing forces in those same countries mistakenly take the DPP to be a progressive or broadly progressive party. When the progressive forces of South Korea and Japan misidentify the DPP as progressive, this seriously distorts their understanding of the cross-strait question and the question of reunification. I sometimes joke with friends in Japan and South Korea, teasing them that their left wing is no match for their right wing in seeing through the problem clearly. South Korea's Yoon Suk-yeol sought the DPP's support before his election campaign, because he understood the DPP; Japan's Shinzo Abe regarded Lai Ching-te as a close friend during his lifetime, because he also understood the DPP.
In sum, what I wish to emphasise is that solidarity in the common struggle of East Asia's anti-imperialist movements is of great importance and demands greater investment of effort from all of us. These friends are also our allies in the movement for cross-strait reunification.
Watch the whole speech here: